This paper investigates contagion between bank risk and sovereign risk in Europe over the period 2006-2011. We de ne contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-speci c as well as country-speci c variables and their interaction. We provide empirical evidence that various contagion channels are at work, including a strong home bias in bank bond portfolios, using the EBA's disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks. We nd that banks with a weak capital and/or funding position are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion.
Introduction
Due to the absence of a common European policy framework for handling the banking crisis as well as missing bank resolution mechanisms, several European governments were forced to respond at the national level by rescuing troubled banks headquartered in their countries during the nancial crisis. Various measures have been taken, ranging from equity injections in troubled banks to the setting-up of bad banks (Petrovic and Tutsch (2009) ). Invariably, these rescue operations have increased national debt burdens and caused a deterioration of public nances. One consequence of the risk transfer from the private sector to sovereign treasuries has been an increased interdependence of banks and states, causing negative feedback loops between their nancial conditions. With the rise of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the link between bankand country risk has intensi ed further, especially for the countries that were quickly identi ed as vulnerable, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the GIIPS countries). This increased interdependence is illustrated in the gures in appendix. The gures depict the country CDS spread and the average bank CDS spread for the countries in our sample. They illustrate that there is a lot of heterogeneity in both the level of the sovereign and bank CDS spreads and in the comovement between the sovereign and bank spreads. The link between the risk pro le of banks and countries in which they are headquartered varies over time and is partly in uenced by shocks in the economy or the banking system. A major shock stemming from the banking system was the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which provoked a substantial increase of CDS spreads for banks and also for certain countries, typically smaller countries with large banks or countries where banks had to be rescued. The sovereign debt crisis further intensi ed the link between bank-and country risk. The sovereign debt crisis is usually considered to have started at the end of 2009, when the newly elected Greek government announced that the country's budget de cit was much larger than previously reported. In the case of Greece, two bailout packages were put together under the surveillance of the "troika" (IMF, ECB, European Commission), one of them including a substantial write-off of Greek 1 http://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/2011/html/is110622.en.html debt in the books of private investors. Later, further rescue packages were implemented for Portugal and Ireland, all under the supervision of the troika. A series of credit rating downgrades of the affected countries followed, causing bond and CDS spreads to widen considerably, as shown, e.g., in the Global Financial Stability Reports of the IMF. 2 During the sovereign debt crisis, banks in Europe were and remain confronted with stress in their capital and liquidity positions. A substantial number of banks had to rebuild their capital buffers after the losses they innitially incurred in their securities (mainly asset-backed) and lending portfolios, especially those with real estate exposures. A general lack of trust hampered the access of banks to money market funding, which was eventually alleviated, at least temporarily, by non-conventional longer-term re nancing operations set up by the ECB. Further, the European Banking Authority (EBA) decided to conduct a sovereign stress testing exercise and required that banks execute detailed capital rebuilding plans before mid-2012. The disclosure of detailed information on banks' exposures to sovereign risk in the EBA (and former CEBS) stress testing exercises provided valuable information to market participants to gauge the risk pro le of European banks.
Overall, the consequence of the continued stress in the banking system and the vulnerability of certain European sovereigns is that the nancial conditions of banks and sovereigns became increasingly intertwined.
Considering this increased interaction between sovereign and bank credit risk, the objective of this paper is twofold. First, we analyze whether we nd empirical evidence of contagion. We investigate the timevarying intensity of the risk spillovers using excess correlations as our preferred contagion metric. Second, we attempt to explain the contagion effect by investigating the relationship between excess bank/sovereign correlations and both bank and country characteristics. While there have been several papers investigating the determinants of either bank risk or sovereign risk in isolation, there is less evidence on the potential mutual contagion effects. By analyzing a number of relevant variables and the interplay between bank and country characteristics, we are able to identify critical interactions that are related to bank/country contagion. This allows us to tackle a series of relevant policy questions concerning the banking system as well as the nancial condition of sovereigns.
The main ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. We document signi cant empirical evidence of contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk during the European sovereign debt crisis. In 2009, when the sovereign debt crisis emerged, we nd signi cant spillovers for 86% of the banks in our sample. Second, given the home bias in banks' government exposures, i.e. their typically larger expo-2 Throughout the paper we use the terms contagion and risk spillover interchangeably. sure towards the home sovereign, we provide empirical evidence con rming the expectation that contagion between banks and their home country is stronger. Third, we nd that the degree of contagion is signicantly linked to bank capital adequacy, and this effect is economically very signi cant. Furthermore, the higher a bank's reliance on short-term funding sources, the higher the intensity of spillovers between banks and sovereigns. Making use of the EBA stress test disclosures, which include bank-speci c information on banks' sovereign debt holdings, we con rm that higher sovereign debt holdings are associated with a stronger bank-sovereign contagion. This suggests that the disclosures made in the context of the EBA stress tests have increased the degree of transparency of bank risk exposures and that market participants use this information to assess the creditworthiness of banks.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on contagion and more speci cally the European sovereign debt crisis. In Section 3 we describe the data and the methodology.
Section 4 reports our empirical ndings, including robustness checks. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and policy implications.
Bank/Sovereign Contagion: Literature Overview
This paper is closely related to three strands of the existing literature. First, our paper is linked to work on the emergence of the European sovereign debt crisis and the transmission channels through which it propagates.
Second, our empirical analysis is closely related to work on nancial contagion. The third strand of relevant literature investigates the risk pro le of bank business models.
Regarding the risk transmission channels, BIS (2011b) identi es four main channels through which sovereign risk can have an impact on nancial institutions. First, there is an asset holdings channel, since the asset side of banks' balance sheets may directly be weakened through losses on holdings of sovereign debt. This channel is investigated by Angeloni and Wolff (2012) , who study whether banks' sovereign exposure to GIIPS countries had an effect on their stock market values. They nd that banks' market performance in the period July to October 2011 was impacted by Greek debt holdings, and in October to December 2011 by Italian and Irish sovereign exposures. Spanish exposure did not appear to have an impact on banks' stock market values. On the relationship between sovereign risk and bank risk, Kyle and Wirick (1990) test whether the August 1982 advent of the Latin American debt crisis affected the implicit value of commercial bank equities. They nd indeed that the market value of banks with major Latin American loan exposure was signi cantly reduced.The second transmission channel is a collateral channel. Sovereign risk can potentially spread to banks when the value of collateral that banks hold in the form of sovereign debt is reduced. This relates to studies such as Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) and Kaminsky et al. (2003) , who describe how negative shocks in one market can directly affect collateral values or cash ows associated with securities in other markets. Related to this, a rating channel may impact banks' funding conditions, since downgrades of sovereigns may in uence the rating of domestic banks negatively. This may in turn affect banks' funding costs and possibly worsen their access to money market and deposit markets. Arezki et al. (2011) , for example, focus on European sovereigns between 2007 and 2010 and show that sovereign rating downgrades cause a signi cant spillover, both across markets and countries. Finally, the guarantee channel is related to the too-big-to-fail status of some large banks. When the scal position of sovereigns is weakened, implicit and explicit government guarantees might lose value, making it harder for the nancial sector to derive bene ts from such guarantees.
In line with the guarantee channel, Brown and Dinc (2011) provide evidence that a country's ability to support its nancial sector, as re ected in its public de cit, affects its treatment of distressed banks.
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) nd that in 2008 systemically large banks saw a reduction in their market valuation in countries running large scal de cits, as these banks became too big to save. When governments bail out banks, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) show that there can be a`credit risk transfer'. Exploring the developments of CDS spreads for Euro area countries and banks from January 2008 to June 2009, they show that the bailouts during that period caused a credit risk shift from the banking to the sovereign sector, with banks' CDS spreads decreasing at the expense of increasing sovereign risk spreads. Alter and Schuler (2012) also focus on bank bailouts during the recent nancial crisis in Europe. They use a vector error correction framework to analyze price discovery mechanism of CDS spreads prior to and after government rescue packages. Their main results state that before bank bailouts, increased bank default risk was transmitted to sovereign CDS, yet the impact the other way around was weak. They further nd that after bank rescues, increased sovereign default risk does have an impact on banks' CDS spreads.
We contribute to the literature on risk transmission channels by analyzing different credit risk transmission channels. First, we use detailed sovereign bond holdings data -collected from the EBA stress test reports -to better identify the asset holdings channel. Further, we focus on the collateral channel by investigating the impact of bank funding structures. The guarantee channel is addressed by including data on bank size relative to the GDP of the country where it is headquartered. Second, this study is closely related to existing work on nancial contagion. The literature on contagion is very broad; excellent overviews can be found in Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) , Dungey et al. (2005) and Pesaran and Pick (2007) . We are particularly interested in default risk contagion at the bank and the sovereign level. As mentioned by Caporin et al. (2012) , recent research on sovereign credit contagion especially focused on the relationship between sovereign risk and common global and nancial factors (see, e.g., Kamin and von Kleist (1999) , Eichengreen and Mody (2000) , Mauro et al. (2002) , Pan and Singleton (2008) , Longstaff et al. (2011) and Ang and Longstaff (2011)) . At the bank level, there exists a vast literature on systemic risk, which is closely related to contagion, since systemic risk usually refers to situations where multiple nancial institutions fail as a result of a common shock or a contagion process (Allen et al. (2010) ).
For an excellent overview on this topic, we refer to Allen et al. (2009) . Papers looking at contagion between the sovereign and the banking level, however, are rather scarce as this topic only recently gained importance during the European debt crisis (see Angeloni and Wolff (2012) , Ejsing and Lemke (2011) , Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2011), Alter and Schuler (2012) , Acharya et al. (2012) , Alter and Beyer (2012) , Gross and Kok (2012) and Bosma and Wedow (2012) ). Acharya et al. (2012) , for example, provide empirical evidence of a two-way feedback between nancial and sovereign credit risk during the recent crisis. They nd evidence for widening sovereign spreads and narrowing bank spreads shortly after a bailout, but signi cantly higher comovement in the long term. Finally, sovereign credit risk is found to be related to the crash risk of the euro. Hui and Chung (2011) investigate the relationship and nd that the impact of sovereign credit risk on crash risk is mainly driven by individual euro-area countries with weaker scal positions.
We add to this part of the literature by documenting the evolution of risk spillovers between the sovereign and the banking sector during the recent nancial crisis and by explaining differences in spillovers based on observable characteristics of banks and sovereigns.
Finally, this paper relates to an extensive literature on the impact of bank business models on their risk pro le. Previous studies primarily focused on the impact of business model characteristics on idiosyncratic or systematic bank risk. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) focus on US banks between 1984 and 1994 and nd that lower capitalized banks are at greater risk of failure, as are banks with low earnings. Stiroh (2004) , Stiroh (2010) and Baele et al. (2007) investigate the link between non-interest income and risk-taking. Others focus on the impact of funding structure on bank risk. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) argue that institutional investors tend to be relatively sophisticated compared to depositors and hence are expected to provide more market discipline. The recent crisis also brought out the dark side of bank wholesale funding, as described by Huang and Ratnovski (2011) . They show that in an environment with a costless but noisy public signal about bank quality, short-term wholesale nanciers have lower incentives to monitor, and instead may withdraw based on negative public news, which could lead to severe funding problems for banks. Related to this, several recent studies have linked these business models to bank performance and riskiness during the recent nancial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz (2011) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) nd that banks heavily relying on wholesale funding were perceived as being more risky by the market during the recent nancial crisis. Altunbas et al. (2011) con rm these ndings and also show that undercapitalization was a major driver of bank distress. Ayadi et al. (2011) screen 26 major European banks for their business models before and after the crisis and conclude that wholesale banks had the worst performance and were most likely to receive state support, whereas retail banks exhibit less risk with a more stable performance. We contribute to this part of the literature by investigating the impact of bank business models on their vulnerability to contagion risk, which became particularly important during the European sovereign debt crisis. Rather than focussing on idiosyncratic or systematic bank risk, we are interested in business models that can allow banks to minimize contagion exposure.
Data & Methodology

Measuring credit risk
To make inference on contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk, we make use of the spreads on credit default swaps. CDS contracts are bilateral swap agreements that represent a protection provided by the CDS seller to the buyer. The seller engages to compensate the buyer in case of the occurrence of a pre-de ned credit event. 3 The buyer makes regular payments to the seller, the so-called CDS spread, and in return receives a compensation for his loss in case of a credit event. Given the setup of CDS agreements, their spreads capture the credit risk of the underlying asset. An important feature of CDS quotes is that CDS markets react instantly to changes in credit risk. Hence, the premia re ect market perceptions in real time, as opposed to rating agencies, for instance, which may take a broader view before changing ratings of entities. Alternative indicators of sovereign and bank credit risk are government and bank bond yields.
As mentioned by Aizenman et al. (2011) , CDS spreads have three main advantages compared to sovereign 3 CDS are typically based on the standard industry terms for credit events, as de ned by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). For further information, see http://www.isda.org. bond spreads. First, CDS spreads provide timelier market-based pricing. Second, using CDS spreads avoids the dif culty in dealing with time to maturity as in the case of using interest rate spreads (of which the zero coupon bonds would be preferred). Third, bond spreads include in ation expectations and demand/supply for lending conditions as well as default risk. As we explicitly want to capture default risk, we focus on CDS spreads. Similar to previous studies on CDS spreads (e.g. Aizenman et al. (2011) , Alter and Schuler (2012) , Anderson (2011) and Barrios et al. (2009) ), we use CDS spreads on 5-year senior debt contracts, since these are known to be the most actively traded and therefore most liquid ones. All CDS quotes are obtained from Bloomberg, CMA. 4 We obtain CDS spread series for 15 countries 5 and for more than 50 banks over the years 2006-2011. The number of banks in our sample increases over time due to data availability. The CDS spread series are transformed into arithmetic returns. We impose strict liquidity criteria to ensure that the CDS spread changes re ect meaningful information on bank and sovereign credit risk. More speci cally, we only retain CDS spread changes during a certain quarter if at least 70% of observations are non-zero during the quarter. 
Measuring contagion
The concept of contagion is dif cult to grasp and there exist several different methodological approaches to analyze contagion. The rst important question is: How to identify contagion? Constancio (2012) lists four criteria that have been used in the literature to de ne contagion, namely: "(i) the transmission is in excess of what can be explained by economic fundamentals; (ii) the transmission is different from regular adjustments observed in tranquil times; (iii) the events constituting contagion are negative extremes; (iv) the transmission is sequential, for example in a causal sense." There is no agreement in the literature on a single 4 Credit Market Analysis. CMA receives quotes for credit instruments from large investors active in over-the-counter markets.
Different sources are aggregated and combined by CMA to calculate one average quote. We use daily end-of-day London prices.
Mayordomo, Peña and Schwartz (2010) nd that the CMA quotes lead the price discovery process in comparison to quotes provided by other databases (GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, Market or JP Morgan). Leland (2009) mentions that CDS spreads from Bloomberg are frequently revised weeks after, and often disagree substantially with Datastream CDS spreads. 5 The 15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, Norway and Switzerland.
de nition, however the rst criterion, which is mainly attributed to Bekaert et al. (2005) , has been widely used, and this is also the one we focus on in our study. 6 As discussed in the introduction, we are interested in potential contagion between sovereign and bank default risk. The risk transfer from the private to the public sector through bank rescue schemes during the recent nancial crisis has increased bank and sovereign interdependence. Furthermore, the exposure of banks to governments through sovereign debt and the potential lower probability of future bailouts for banks due to deteriorating public nances are additional reasons to expect higher interconnectedness between banks and states. An intuitive starting point to measure this potential increase in interdependence could be looking at simple correlations between two default risk indicators. However, simple correlations during crisis periods could be misleading, as one would simply expect higher correlations during periods of higher volatility (see Boyer et al. (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) Forbes and Rigobon (2002) propose. Assuming that CDS spreads are adequate credit risk proxies and assuming that CDS spread changes follow a linear factor structure, increased correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk can be driven by three potential sources (also see Anderson (2011) ): (i) an increase in exposure of CDS spread changes to common factors, (ii) increased correlation between the common factors, and (iii) an increase in the correlation between unexplained CDS spread changes, which is what we label as contagion. More speci cally, the correlation between CDS spread changes of a bank b and a country c can be decomposed as follows:
The excess correlation between a bank b and a country c is then de ned as 6 The dif culty of identifying contagion is not only present in academic literature, but practitioners and bankers face the same challenge. In 2009, the Fitch Global Credit Derivatives Survey revealed that many banks were surprised by the sovereign-bank contagion that built up in the markets during the previous year. In particular, "market participants, when referring to contagion, highlight the speed at which credit spreads widened, particularly for nancial institutions and sovereigns, the volatility of credit spreads, the unanticipated convergence in correlation values across asset classes and the heightened perception of counterparty risk which resulted in many institutions refusing to deal with other ones in the nancial markets." climate should reduce default probabilities and hence we expect a negative sign for the stock market index in our factor models. The third common factor is the Vstoxx 9 volatility index, capturing market expectations of volatility in the Eurozone (also see, e.g., Berndt et al. (2005) , Tang and Yan (2010) ). This index is generally perceived as a market sentiment or investor fear indicator. The higher the volatility, the higher the economic uncertainty. We thus expect a positive relation between credit spreads and market volatility. Finally, we control for market expectations about future conditions in the nancial market, measured with the Term Spread. The term spread is calculated as the difference between the 10-year government bond yield for each country and the 1-year Euribor rate. We expect a negative relationship between the term spread and CDS spreads. All state variables are obtained from Datastream and transformed into arithmetic returns, except for the term spread, which we include in rst differences.
7 DS mnemonic "DIXE5EC". Both nancial and non-nancial rms are included. In order to be consistent with our bank and sovereign CDS data, we use the index that is based on 5-year maturity assets with end-of-day quotes. 8 DS mnemonic "TOTMKEU". It mirrors all EU stock markets, not only the nancial sector. 9 DS mnemonic "VSTOXXI". The calculation of the VSTOXX is based on option prices for EURO STOXX 50, which incorporates stocks from 50 supersector leaders from 12 Eurozone countries. For more information, see: http://www.stoxx.com.
With the above selection of state variables, the regression speci cation of the factor model looks as follows:
where CDS i;t is the change in CDS spread for bank or country i, M arket is the stock market index for the EU, Itraxx is the iTraxx Europe CDS index, V stoxx is the a volatility index and T erm is the term spread. To control for possible time variation in the exposures we run this factor model for every year in the sample separately. This way, we obtain time-varying coef cient estimates. In Section 4.3, we redo our analysis for two alternative speci cations of the factor model: (i) we run the factor models including the Itraxx index as the only state variable, and (ii) we take a different choice of the regression windows, coinciding with major credit events in the CDS market. The main results remain unaltered.
The above analysis allows us to investigate whether, on a year-by-year basis, there is contagion between all bank/sovereign pairs. However, we are also interested in how this contagion evolves over time. To formally test whether changes in excess correlation are statistically signi cant, we make use of the Fisher transformation of (excess) correlation coef cients. We denote with corr the correlation between a bank and a country (the home country or another country). The Fisher transformed correlation is then given by corr
The standard error or corr b;c is given by
where N is the number of observations. The test-statistic for the difference between two measures of (excess) correlation corr b;c (labeled the Z-statistic) is given by
where N t 1 is the number of observations during the rst period, and N t 2 the number of observations during the second period. The Z-statistic is normally distributed, and hence signi cance can be assessed with the usual test statistics.
Explaining contagion
Once we have established the presence of contagion between sovereign and bank credit risk, we take the analysis a step further by investigating bank-and country-speci c characteristics that could be driving this excess correlation. For each country-bank combination in our sample, we calculate excess correlations on a quarterly basis using daily CDS data 10 . This is the dependent variable of interest in our panel analysis.
Throughout the analysis, we exploit the fact that we have multiple observations (i.e. excess correlations with different countries) for each bank at each point in time. This allows us to look at the impact of countryspeci c characteristics while making abstraction of bank-speci c factors. Similarly, since we have multiple observations for each country at each point in time, we are able to analyze the impact of bank-speci c characteristics on the bank-country relationship.
We start by exploring cross-sectional differences between bank-country excess correlations by focussing on bank balance sheet characteristics. For example, we hypothesize that banks with higher capital adequacy levels are better able to withstand nancial shocks, lowering the expected correlation between the bank and country level. To identify the impact of bank-speci c factors we regress the excess correlations on a vector of bank-speci c characteristics 11 and a home/foreign country time xed effect. By using this three-way xed effect, we can compare the excess correlation of bank i with country j to the excess correlation of another bank k -located in the same country z as bank i -with country j at the same point in time. This way, the variation left in the country-bank correlations can only be related to bank-speci c differences. The speci cation thus looks as follows:
where Corr i;j;t is the excess correlation between bank i and country j at time t, Z i;t is a vector of bankspeci c variables and z;j;t is a three-way xed effect, which addresses differences over time at the home and foreign country level.
In a next step we use a similar setup to analyze the potential impact of country-speci c characteristics.
We start by analyzing whether domestic banks have a stronger relation with the sovereign, by looking at the impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads on excess correlations, and by focusing on whether bank-speci c characteristics can change the impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads. We use the following speci cation:
Corr i;j;t = + 1 Home i;j + 2 CDS j;t + 3 CDS j;t X i;t + i;t + " i;j;t (3) 10 We calculate excess correlations at quarterly frequency since this is the highest frequency for which we have bank balance sheet data available. The balance sheet data is linked to correlations in a later step. 11 More detailed information on the bank-speci c variables that we use can be found below in part 3.4 Bank-and country-speci c factors where X i;t is a vector of bank-speci c variables , CDS j;t is the sovereign CDS spread of country j at time t , Home i;j is a dummy variable, which equals one when bank i is located in country j , i;t is a bank-time xed effect and " i;j;t is the error term. By using bank-time xed effects, we can compare the relationship of the same bank with different countries at the same point in time. In other words, by using bank-time xed effects we ensure that the variation left in the excess correlations can be attributed to country-speci c factors. We expect the home dummy coef cient to be positive and signi cant for several reasons. First, banks tend to have a strong home bias in their government bond portfolios, making them more vulnerable to home country shocks. Second, when banks get into distress, the probability of a bailout of that bank increases. As bailouts are typically nanced by the home country of the bank, this can cause a contagion effect. Related to this, a government in a weak scal position is less likely to step in when things go wrong in the banking sector, potentially increasing the credit risk of the nancial institutions in the home country. Fourth, problems at the sovereign level may lead to scal consolidation, which, although potentially bene cial in the long term, may lead to lower economic activity in the short term, which could increase loan losses and hence bank credit risk (Avdjiev and Caruana (2012) ).We also expect that higher default risk at the country level will lead to higher excess correlations. Bank default risk is more likely to be related to sovereign default risk when sovereigns are in distress situations than when default risk at the sovereign level is low. We are also interested in whether some bank business models are better in withstanding sovereign distress than others. Therefore, we also interact the sovereign CDS spread with a set of bank business model characteristics.
In a following step, we consider the actual exposures of banks towards European countries and analyze whether these exposures have a direct impact on the contagion variable. We apply a similar setup as in equation 3. We focus on sovereign debt exposures, for which we have data available from the EBA stress test reports since mid-2010. We hypothesize that a bank's default risk is more strongly correlated with a country's default risk when the bank has a higher exposure to that country.
In a last step, we focus on country-speci c factors that could be driving the relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and the excess correlations. We hypothesize that a banks' default risk is more strongly correlated with countries that have higher debt-to-GDP ratios, higher government revenues in percentage of GDP, a larger banking sector (in percentage of GDP) and a less optimistic economic sentiment indicator.
We again expect this effect to be stronger towards the home country, which is why we also interact each of these variables with the home country dummy. The regression speci cation looks as follows:
Corr i;j;t = + 1 Home i;j + 2 X j;t + 3 Home i;j X j;t + i;t + " i;j;t
where X j;t is a vector of country-speci c variables 12 . By using bank-time xed effects, we can compare the relationship of the same bank with different countries at the same point in time.
Bank-and country-speci c factors
An important contribution of our paper is to investigate the relationship between bank/sovereign contagion and the characteristics of the banks and countries involved. For the banks in the sample, we use a variety of measures intended to capture their business model. Consequently, we focus on indicators of their retail orientation, funding structure, diversi cation and, especially, the banks' capital adequacy (see Baele et al. (2012) , Altunbas et al. (2011) , Ayadi et al. (2011) ). For countries, the selected variables focus on debt sustainability and business cycle conditions. Bank-speci c data is mainly taken from Thomson Reuters Worldscope database; country-speci c series are taken from a range of other sources (Eurostat, Oxford
Economics, ECB statistical data warehouse). Summary statistics for these variables can be found in Table   3 .
The rst bank-speci c variable we consider is bank size, measured as the ratio of each bank`s total assets over its home country GDP. The rationale is that large banks are more likely to be systemic institutions that may need a public bailout in case of distress. The larger the bank, the more likely it is that a bank bailout will affect con dence in the nancial system (BIS (2011a)). We expect that the relative size of banks is positively related to the excess bank/sovereign correlations, especially with the home sovereign.
Capital regulation is the cornerstone of the prudential regulation of banks. Since capital serves as a buffer for unexpected losses (e.g. value losses on sovereign bonds), the higher the capital buffer, the less risky a bank is and, hence, the lower we expect the excess correlations with sovereigns to be. In general, banks with adequate capital buffers are perceived by market participants to be able to withstand shocks much better than their less capitalized peers, which is re ected, e.g., in a lower market beta (Altunbas et al. (2011); Baele et al. (2007) ). In our main analysis, we focus on an unweighted capital ratio that is calculated as the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over total assets. As a robustness check, we also consider the risk weighted Tier 1 ratio.
12 More detailed information on the country-speci c variables that we use can be found below in part 3.4 Bank-and countryspeci c factors
The fundamental role of a bank is to transform deposits into loans to businesses and households. Therefore the loan-to-asset ratio is a typical indicator of a bank's retail orientation. Retail banks have been perceived as less risky than their non-retail peers, especially during the nancial crisis. Schepens and Vander Vennet (2009) show that European retail banks, de ned as banks with a high loan-to-assets ratio as well as a high deposit-to-assets ratio, have considerably lower market betas. Moreover, when a bank is characterized by a high proportion of loans in its total assets, the relative weight of securities is lower, entailing less exposure to (sovereign) bonds. Finally, when a bank operates a pro table lending portfolio, this should serve as a generator of pro ts and capital, which make a bank safer over time. Consequently, we expect that banks with a relatively high loan-to-asset ratio will exhibit lower excess correlations.
To assess the relevance of banks' exposures to (foreign) sovereign risk, we include information on On the liability side of the balance sheet, the composition of the funding sources is an important determinant of the risk pro le of a bank. Several papers have demonstrated that banks relying on wholesale funding, predominantly through the interbank market, are perceived by market participants to be more risky than banks predominantly funded with retail deposits. Especially during the nancial crisis, funding through potentially volatile sources proved to be catastrophic for some banks. Altunbas et al. (2011) and Schepens and Vander Vennet (2009) report that banks with a relatively high proportion of wholesale funding exhibit signi cantly higher systematic risk, measured by the market beta. Hence, when the asset quality of a bank deteriorates (in this case because of the exposure to bonds of fragile sovereigns), informed market partic-ipants (e.g., institutional depositors) will focus on the sustainability of the bank's funding structure. This may hamper access to the interbank market and increase the cost of funding in the repo or deposit markets.
Such risk spillovers between sovereigns and banks are another example of transmission channels that affect the cost of funding for banks. We measure the impact of a bank`s funding structure by including the ratio of short term and money market funding over total funding.
The degree of revenue diversi cation is captured by the proportion of non-interest income in total revenues (see Stiroh (2006b) and Baele et al. (2007) ). When a bank is less reliant on interest income, it is supposed to be better diversi ed in the case of negative shocks to its interest income or funding cost. However, non-interest sources of income may be more volatile, especially in periods of nancial market stress, and hence provide an imperfect hedge. As a result, the ultimate effect on bank/sovereign excess correlations is unclear a priori.
The country-speci c variables attempt to capture the state of public nances as well as the importance of business cycle conditions in each of the countries concerned. The main variable of interest is the debtto-GDP ratio, since it is the major determinant of the sovereign rating (see, e.g., Bernoth et al. (2004) ). We also include the ratio of government revenues to GDP for each country as a proxy for the revenue-generating capacity that sovereigns have to deal with banking problems. Since taxes are needed to service additional debt, this is an indicator of the hard budget constraint countries are facing. The larger the banks in a country, the more problematic bank rescues may be for public nances. Therefore, we include the size of the bank sector in each country as a proportion of GDP. The bigger the relative size of the banking system, the higher we expect bank/sovereign risk spillovers to be. Further, to account for business cycle conditions, an indicator for economic sentiment is added to our analysis. We use the economic sentiment indicator provided by the European Commission, which is composed of ve sectoral con dence indicators (industrial, services, consumer, construction and retail trade) with different weights, each con dence indicator being based on surveys. Including these variables, and some interaction terms, enables us to get insight into the determinants of bank/sovereign contagion.
Results
Excess correlations
We investigate the presence of contagion between banks and countries by examining the excess correlation, which is the correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk over and above what can be explained by fundamental factors. We start by giving an overview of the factor models used to calculate the excess correlations (see eq. 1). Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the state variables in our analysis, whereas Table 4 shows the average coef cient estimates and their signi cance in the bank factor models. 13 Running these models on a yearly basis allows us to analyze the evolution over time of the impact of the state variables and they eventually yield the excess correlations. We notice a sharp increase in exposure to economy-wide credit risk (measured by the iTraxx factor) during 2007 and 2008 and this exposure remains elevated until the end of the sample period. Table 4 shows that the vast majority of banks loads signi cantly on the iTraxx factor (up to 97% of the banks in the sample in 2007). The signi cance of the other coef cient estimates is much lower (below 10% for both the market factor and Vstoxx implied volatility). These results are in line with Ejsing and Lemke (2011) , who use the iTraxx index of non-nancial CDS premia as single common risk factor, arguing that it explains most of the variability in corporate and sovereign CDS spreads.
However, including more state variables implies that we control for more possible sources of commonality, which implies that the excess country/bank correlations are estimated more conservatively 14 .
In the left hand side panel of Figure 1 , we investigate how the average correlation between bank and home country credit risk varies over time, whereas the right hand side panel of Figure 1 reports the corresponding correlation in residuals, i.e. excess correlation, which is our preferred contagion measure. As expected, we notice an increased correlation between sovereign and bank CDS spreads during the recent nancial crisis in the left hand side panel of Figure 1 . As mentioned before, an increase in correlation does not necessarily imply evidence of contagion. Instead, contagion can only be inferred from a statistically signi cant increase in excess correlation. The right hand side panel of Figure 1 shows the average yearly excess correlation between the sovereign CDS spread and the average CDS spread of the banks headquartered in the country. We observe that correlation in CDS spread changes are on average higher than correlation in the residuals. Table 5 indicates that the average bank/sovereign correlation in our sample is 35%, whereas 13 For convenience, we only report the results for the banks. The results of the sovereign factor models are similar and are available upon request. 14 In part 4.3 we discuss the robustness of our results w.r.t. an alternative speci cation of the factor model. the average excess correlation is 17%. Comparing both panels in Figure 1 indicates that common factors can only partly explain the increase in correlations during the crisis; even after controlling for common factors, there is still a strong increase in correlations between sovereign and bank CDS spreads between 2006 and 2011. It are precisely these excess correlations that we try to explain using country-and bank-speci c variables.
The gures show a clear increase in excess correlations over the past years. To formally test whether this increase is also statistically signi cant, we make use of the Fisher transformation of (excess) correlation coef cients. The left-hand side in Table 6 Table 6 .
To summarize, we nd signi cant evidence of increasing contagion between banks and countries in the period covering the bank crisis as well as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Yet, we are particularly interested in how to explain this excess correlation. We therefore turn to the analysis of bank-and countryspeci c characteristics.
Explaining bank-country contagion
In this part, we study the impact of bank-and country-speci c characteristics on bank-country contagion.
The particular structure of our database, in which we have excess correlations for each bank in our sample with different sovereigns on a quarterly basis, allows us to disentangle the impact of bank-and countryspeci c characteristics. More speci cally, by either comparing the relation between one bank and different sovereigns (using bank-time xed effects) or by comparing the relationship of different banks with one country (using country-time xed effects), we can make a distinction between the impact of bank and country variables. Except for the home country dummy, all right hand side variables in these regressions are standardized, which means that the coef cients show the impact of a one standard deviation change of the independent variables.
In a rst step, we study the impact of bank-speci c characteristics on the country-bank excess correlations. We do this by comparing the excess correlations of different banks from the same country with a single country at a certain point in time. In terms of the regression setup, this implies that we introduce home country/foreign country time xed effects. By comparing banks from the same country, we prevent that sovereign relationships that are unrelated to country-bank relationships disturb our analysis. It also allows us to control for potential differences between banks due to regulatory or institutional differences at the home country level. By comparing the different banks with a single country, we make sure that the only variation left in the excess correlations is due to bank-speci c factors. The rst speci cation of Table 7 shows the impact of a set of bank characteristics on contagion. We start by regressing the excess correlations on ve bank balance sheet characteristics, i.e. bank size (total assets over GDP), asset structure (loan-toasset ratio), funding risk (short term funding over total funding), capital adequacy (total capital ratio) and income diversi cation (non-interest income as a percentage of total income). In general, we nd that bank size, capital adequacy levels and funding structure have a signi cant impact on bank-country contagion.
For example, the coef cient of minus 1.76 for the total capital ratio implies that a one standard deviation increase in the total capital ratio (i.e. a rise in the total capital ratio of about 2.2 percentage points, see Table 3 ) leads to a decrease in country-bank excess correlations of about 1.76 percentage points. For the average bank in our sample, this means a reduction in excess correlation of almost 8 percent. Furthermore, banks with a higher proportion of short-term debt in their total funding exhibit higher bank-country excess correlations. The impact of a standard deviation change in the short-funding ratio is similar to the impact of a standard deviation increase in the capital ratio. This con rms that banks with potentially volatile funding are more exposed to shocks in the quality of their assets, con rming the presence of the collateral channel (see Section 2). This result is in line with the ndings of Vuillemey and Peltonen (2012) , who investigate whether sovereign CDS mitigate or amplify shocks on sovereign bonds. Their main nding is that the main risk for CDS sellers is in the sudden increases in collateral requirements.
These nding stress the importance of adequate bank capital buffers for bank stability. Whereas previous studies showed a strong effect of bank capital on bank-speci c risk indicators (see, e.g. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2011) ) our ndings suggest that adequate capital levels are also an important buffer against contagion. Similarly, where Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) nd that banks increase most of their short-term funding at the cost of enhanced bank fragility, our ndings point at the importance of stable funding as a feature in mitigating contagion.
In column 2 of Table 7 we interact each bank-speci c variable with a home country dummy to analyze whether there is any asymmetry in the above results caused by a stronger relation with the home country.
The results show that the impact of the bank-speci c variables is equally strong towards the home country compared to other countries, as none of the interaction terms is signi cant. The impact of the size of a bank (in percentage of GDP) on the excess correlations, for example, is not statistically different when comparing the home country excess correlations with the foreign country excess correlations. This suggests that there is no direct evidence in favor of the guarantee channel in this setup. However, further results using a different setup (see Table 9 ) indicate that the guarantee channel is at work. Overall, bank size is positively related to excess correlations, irrespective of focussing on the relation with the home country or a foreign country.
In the third column, we add banks`sovereign debt exposure as an explanatory variable. Notice that this reduces the sample size, as we only have information on debt exposures from 2010 onwards. The results for this setup rst of all con rm our previous ndings; better capitalized banks and banks with a lower proportion of short-term debt in their total funding exhibit lower bank-country excess correlations, although the capital ratio becomes insigni cant in this setup. Furthermore, the impact of the income diversi cation variable becomes signi cant. Thus, in this subsample, banks with a lower percentage of non-interest income have signi cantly lower excess correlations. The fact that this variable has a stronger impact in this subsample is due to the sample period. 15 As we only have data on sovereign debt exposures from 2010 onwards, this subsample covers the recent crisis period. Being a more retail-oriented bank, i.e. having a lower proportion of non-interest income, reduces bank risk (see, e.g. Altunbas et al. (2011) , Baele et al. (2007) ) and helps to survive the most stressful moments of the sovereign debt crisis. These results point to a change in risk perception during periods of increased sovereign distress of certain bank business models. The sovereign debt exposure variable itself is not signi cant in this setup. We would expect higher exposures to lead to 15 We run the same regression as in column one on the sample for which we have EBA data (column 3) and reach similar conclusions. This con rms that the change in signi cance for the loan to asset ratio and the income diversi cation variable is due to a the change in sample period and is not caused by the introduction of the EBA exposure variable.
higher excess correlations. However, we control for home country/foreign country time xed effects, which means that we compare the relationship of different banks from the same country with one and the same country at a certain point in time. Thus, the insigni cant result for the sovereign exposure variable is most likely a re ection of the fact that the variation in exposures between banks in the same country is rather limited. 16 Column 4 of Table 7 shows that our results also hold when using the Tier 1 ratio as a capital ratio instead of the total capital ratio. Overall, our results lend support to the new prudential rules contained in Basel III, which focus both on the level and quality of bank capital as well as the need for stable funding sources.
Next, we focus on the impact of home country effects, sovereign CDS spreads and the actual sovereign bond exposures of the banks on excess correlations. We expect that excess correlations will be higher when a country`s default risk is higher, when we consider the relation between a bank and its home country and/or when banks are more exposed to sovereigns through their bond portfolio (asset holdings channel). Our contagion variable measures the degree of excess correlation between a country and a bank, but in itself does not allow us to make any statements about the direction of the spillover. Using bank-time xed effects allows us to compare the excess correlations of one bank with different sovereigns.This gives us a better view on how factors at the sovereign level can affect the excess correlations between sovereigns and banks.
By interacting the sovereign CDS spread with bank-speci c variable, we are also able to analyze which bank characteristics can act as a buffer againsts spillovers from the sovereign level.
In the rst column of Table 8 , we regress the contagion variable on a home country dummy, the sovereign CDS spread and an interaction terms between both while controlling for bank-time xed effects and for a potential non-linear relationship between the sovereign CDS spread and excess correlations. We start by focusing on the relationship between a bank and its home country. We hypothesize that the contagion between a bank and its home country is stronger than between a bank and any other sovereign. This can be caused by several factors, be it a strong home bias in their bond holding portfolio, higher bailout risk or scal consolidation leading to lower economic activity in the short term (Avdjiev and Caruana (2012) ). The rst column of Table 8 , corroborates the home country hypothesis. The excess correlation between a bank and its home country is on average 2.7 percentage points higher than with another country, after controlling for the impact of sovereign CDS spreads. Next, our results show that banks have higher excess correlations 16 Furthermore, when using a different regression setup (bank-time xed effects),we do nd a signi cant impact for sovereign bond exposures, see Table 9 below.
with countries that have a higher level of credit risk. The squared term of the CDS spread is negative, indicating that the positive effect becomes negative when the spread gets higher. However, the impact only becomes negative for countries above the 96th percentile, which in practice means that we only measure a negative relationship with Greece. Hence, except for Greece, the expected positive relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and excess correlations holds. Also interesting is the positive and highly signi cant impact of the interaction term between the sovereign spread and the home dummy, indicating that the excess correlations of a bank with its home country is higher when the home country has a higher level of credit risk.
In the second column of Table 8 , we test whether there is an asset holdings channel at work during the sovereign debt crisis. We do this by introducing bank-speci c sovereign bond exposures, which we collect from the 2010 and 2011 EBA stress test exercises. The results in column 2 of Table 8 show that a bank with a one standard deviation higher exposure to country A than to country B has an excess correlation with country
A which is about 1.5 percentage points higher. This con rms the presence of an asset holdings channel during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, the positive coef cient for the interaction term between the sovereign CDS level and the exposure variable in column 3 shows that a higher sovereign CDS spread ampli es the impact of the asset holdings channel, although this interaction term is only signi cant at the 15% level. Overall, we nd support for the asset holdings channel. Banks with a larger exposure to a country are more vulnerable to risk shocks originating from that country.
In the last three columns of Table 8 , we again focus on the importance of bank-speci c characteristics.
More speci cally, instead of looking at the direct impact of bank characteristics, which we did in Table 7, we now investigate which bank characteristics could reduce the negative impact of higher sovereign credit risk.
In other words, we analyze how banks could protect themselves against increased credit risk at the sovereign level. We do this by adding interaction terms between the sovereign CDS spreads and bankspeci c characteristics in our regression speci cation. In column 4, we focus on the sample for which we have EBA data available, in the fth column we do the same analysis but for a broader sample and in the last column we replace the total capital ratio with the Tier 1capital ratio. Our results again stress the importance of solid capital ratios to withstand sovereign default risk. More speci cally, the coef cient of -0.8 for the interaction term between the sovereign CDS spread and the total capital ratio in the fourth and the fth column shows that a one standard deviation rise in the total capital ratio lowers the impact of a standard deviation change in sovereign credit risk on excess correlations from 1.83 percentage points to 1.15 percentage points, which is a decline of more than 35 percent. The last column in Table 8 con rms that this result also holds when using an alternative capital ratio (Tier 1 ratio). The interaction terms between the other bank-speci c characteristics and the sovereign CDS spread are not signi cant. Overall, the results in these last three columns show that higher capital adequacy ratios not only have a direct impact on excess correlations, but also have a positive indirect effect by lowering the negative impact of higher sovereign credit risk, which underscores their importance for maintaining nancial stability.
So far, the only country-speci c variable we investigated is the sovereign CDS spread. We show that banks are more strongly correlated with countries that have a higher level of credit risk and that higher capital levels can reduce this negative effect. We now take this analysis one step further by studying countryspeci c characteristics that are expected to have an impact on the credit risk of a country and could thus be of importance for the contagion between banks and sovereigns. By again using bank-time xed effects, we analyze the correlation of each bank in our sample with the different countries, which allows us to attribute differences in excess correlation to country-speci c factors. We focus on the impact of government debt (debt to GDP ratio), government revenues (as percentage of GDP), the importance of the banking sector in a country (total bank sector size over GDP) and the overall economic sentiment.
The results in column one of Table 9 show that bank-country contagion is more pronounced for countries with a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. The positive and signi cant coef cient of 1.21 for the debt ratio shows that for every standard deviation change in the debt ratio, the excess correlation increases by 1.21 percentage points. Higher debt ratios reduce the probability of a bailout in the banking sector and also lead to higher bank-level credit risk through the bond portfolios of nancial institutions, which explains this positive and signi cant effect. However, the standard deviation of the debt ratio in our sample is around 27 percent (see Table 3 ), hence the economic impact is rather limited in this setup. Other country-speci c characteristics, such as the share of government revenues in GDP or the size of the banking sector in a country do not turn out to be statistically signi cant. Furthermore, even after controlling for these country-speci c factors, the home-country relationship still remains an important driver of the excess correlations. The coef cient of 2.88 for the home dummy is positive and signi cant at the 1 percent level. The coef cient for the economic sentiment indicator is positive, which is somewhat unexpected. This could indicate that market participants base their risk assessment rather on the health of bank balance sheets than on the economic conditions in a country. Moreover, growth has been dismal in many of the countries during the sample period, which makes it more dif cult to assess the potential impact of economic conditions. In the second column of Table 9 we analyze whether the home-country effect and the country characteristics potentially reinforce each other. Interestingly, the positive and signi cant interaction term between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the home dummy con rms that government debt is an important contributor to the contagion between a bank and its home country. More speci cally, the impact of the home country dummy more than doubles when we compare a bank operating in a country with an average debt-to-GDP ratio with a bank operating in a country that has a debt-to-GDP ratio in the 90th percentile of our sample. 17 This result is in line with the argument that banks exhibit a home bias in their bond portfolios and with the conjecture that governments in a weak scal position are less likely to step in to save nancial institutions when needed, con rming the presence of both the asset holdings channel as well as the guarantee channel. Comparing column 1 with column 2 also shows that the in uence of the debt-to-GDP ratio is most pronounced in explaining the excess correlation of banks with their home country. A one standard deviation change in the debt-to-GDP ratio adds 1.05%
points to the excess correlation for foreign countries, whereas this augments to 3.04% points (1.05+1 .99) for home countries. Column 3 shows that the signi cant impact of the debt-to-GDP ratio also holds when controlling for sovereign bond exposures. Furthermore, in this speci cation we also nd a positive and signi cant coef cient for the government revenues variable. A high level of government revenues lowers the possibility to further increase taxes in future crisis situations, which will make it harder for governments to react to a crisis and could thus lead to increased credit risk. Overall, these results indicate that banks tend to be more strongly correlated with countries with less sustainable debt levels, and this effect is largest in magnitude for the home country. This con rms that worsening public nances are one of the main drivers for contagion effects between sovereigns and banks. The implication is that restoring stability in the nancial system requires simultaneous efforts in the eld of public nances.
Robustness
In this section we show that our main nding are robust to using alternative factor models for calculating the excess correlations and to different ways of clustering standard errors in the panel regressions. Furthermore, column 3 of Table 7 and column 5 of Table 8 already indicated that our results also hold when using an 17 The coef cient for the home country banks becomes 2.57 (coef cient for home dummy) + 1.99*1.5 (coef cient for interaction term*standardized value of the debt to GDP ratio at the 90th percentile) = 5.5 for banks operating in a country in the 90th percentile in terms of debt ratio, whereas the coef cient for a bank operating in a country with the average debt-to-GDP ratio equals 2.57+
1.99*0 = 2.57.
alternative capital ratio.
We start by evaluating the choice of the factor models used to calculate the excess correlations. In our main analysis, we calculate the excess correlations based on yearly factor models that include four common factors, i.e. an overall stock market index for the EU, the iTraxx Europe CDS index, the Vstoxx volatility index and the term spread. To make sure that our main results are not in uenced by our choice of factor model, we calculate two sets of new excess correlations, one set based on a factor model only including the iTraxx CDS index and a set based on a factor model with the same factors, but with an alternative choice of the time periods. The iTraxx-only model is an interesting benchmark as it is a model that is frequently used in the existing CDS literature (see e.g., Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) ). The model with alternative time periods addresses the critique that structural breaks within the yearly regression window could potentially bias our measure of contagion. To address this issue, we divide our sample period into different time windows, chosen at well speci ed events, to avoid structural breaks within the time (Table 11 and 12) or at the country level (Table 10 ) instead of at the bank-time or at the country-time level. This alternative clustering setup allows that the error terms are correlated over time within the same bank/country, while they were only allowed to be correlated within the same bank/country at one point in time in our baseline setup. The results all con rm our main ndings. Both higher capital ratios and lower money market funding decrease excess correlations (Table 10) . Furthermore, higher capital ratios reduce the positive impact of higher sovereign CDS spreads on excess correlations (Table 11 ). The robustness checks also con rm the existence of a home country effect and the positive relation between sovereign debt exposures and excess correlations. Finally, higher debt ratios are positively related to higher excess correlations, especially when focussing on the relationship between domestic banks and the home sovereign (Table 12) .
Conclusions
This paper provides empirical evidence on risk spillovers between banks and sovereigns during the European nancial and sovereign debt crisis. Whereas there is a substantial literature exploring the determinants of bank or sovereign credit risk (measured by bond yields or CDS spreads) separately, empirical evidence exploring contagion between the two is scarce. This paper attempts to ll the gap by examining the pattern of contagion in the sovereign-bank nexus in Europe and by investigating which bank-speci c and countryspeci c determinants drive contagion.
We de ne contagion as "excess correlation", i.e. correlation over and above what is explained by fundamental factors. Our preferred measure of sovereign and bank credit risk is CDS spreads. After controlling for common factors (market risk, economy-wide credit risk, term spread changes and volatility), we document signi cant empirical evidence of bank/sovereign contagion. In the year 2009, when the sovereign debt crisis emerged, we nd signi cant spillovers for 86% of the banks in the sample. This number increases to 94% when only considering spillovers between the banks and the GIIPS countries. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence of a substantial home bias, con rming the expectation that contagion between banks and their home country is stronger. The close link between domestic banks and their sovereigns can be attributed to several factors. We report evidence supporting the asset holdings channel caused by the large share of domestic debt in banks' sovereign portfolios and evidence in favor of the guarantee channel caused by the fact that the presence of large banks increases the bailout pressure on governments.
We exploit the cross-sectional differences between bank/sovereign excess correlations by relating them to bank-and country-speci c variables. We include a broad set of measures intended to capture the strategic choices inherent in bank business models. The capital adequacy level of banks has the most economically signi cant effect; we nd that an increase in the total capital ratio reduces the excess bank-country correlation signi cantly. Furthermore, the lower the banks' reliance on short-term funding sources (measured as the proportion of short-term funding in total debt), the lower the intensity of risk spillovers between banks and sovereigns. These ndings support the new regulatory Basel III framework which imposes more stringent capital adequacy ratios and new liquidity measures. At the sovereign level, we nd that higher debt-to-GDP ratios signi cantly increase the degree of bank/sovereign contagion. The effect even becomes twice as big for countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios (in the sample, a ratio above 101%, compared to the average of 74%). This nding motivates the recommendation that public nances need to be consolidated, especially in the countries with high debt levels. A credible commitment to reduce debt levels over time will probably require efforts at the domestic level as well as enforceable coordination at the European level and, perhaps, some form of (partial) debt mutualisation.
We investigate the relationship between bank/sovereign risk spillovers and banks' holdings of sovereign debt. For that purpose, the EBA disclosures of banks' sovereign exposures prove to be particularly valuable, since they allow us to verify whether (i) banks with different holdings of sovereign debt exhibit higher excess correlations with the countries involved, and (ii) whether excess correlations are higher for the countries to which the bank is more exposed. Using different regression speci cations, we con rm both hypotheses.
Hence, investors differentiate rationally between countries with different levels of indebtedness and between banks with different sovereign debt exposures.
We also document that increased sovereign credit risk is in itself a driver of bank-sovereign excess correlations. We nd that contagion is more pronounced when the sovereign CDS spreads are higher. Moreover, we document that the link between sovereign debt holdings and contagion is stronger when the sovereign CDS spread is higher. When we investigate country-speci c determinants of excess correlations, we nd that sovereign debt-to-GDP levels play a decisive role as the main determinant of bank-sovereign risk spillovers.
In the period of increased stress in sovereign debt markets, we document that also the government revenue ratio reinforces the risk spillovers. These ndings suggest that credible plans to put public nances on a sustainable track are a necessary ingredient of any crisis resolution attempt.
In terms of policy implications, our results suggest several actions to alleviate the contagion between bank and sovereign risk. The ambition of policymakers and supervisors should be to (1) decrease the probability of contagion and (2) when contagion occurs, decrease the intensity of the risk spillovers. In order to achieve these objectives, action in three dimensions is necessary: make banks more robust, make publicnances more resilient and weaken the bank-sovereign link. On the bank side, the degree of capital adequacy turns out to be crucial. Moreover, banks should be restricted in their reliance on money market funding.
Both elements are at the core of the internationally agreed Basel III rules that will be phased in gradually.
Our results lend support to these objectives and policymakers and supervisors should provide incentives to banks to adjust their business models accordingly. Since the home bias in bank bond portfolios is identi ed as a channel of contagion, there might be scope for concentration limits in various dimensions. On the sovereign side, making public nances more sustainable and ensuring that resolution mechanisms are in place to deal with distressed banks are important policy objectives. Finally, our results indicate that breaking the link between banks and their sovereigns should be a priority. This will require a so-called banking union at the European (or Eurozone) level, implying that not only bank supervision should be executed at the European level (e.g. by the ECB), but also that deposit insurance and bank resolution, and the associated burden sharing arrangements have to implemented on a European scale. included are a EU stock market Index, the European iTraxx index, the Vstoxx volatility index and the term spread between the 10-year government bond yield for each country and the 1-year Euribor rate. For each of these variables, we report the average yearly coef cient for the banks in our sample and the percentage of banks for which the speci c state variable is signi cant in the factor models. We also report the number of banks in the sample for each year and the average adjusted R-squared. Changes in the number of observations are due to data availability of bank CDS spreads. In the rst column, we regress country-bank excess correlations on a set of bank-speci c characteristics and a home country/foreign country -time xed effect. By including this xed effect, we compare the excess correlation of bank i at time t with country j to the correlation of another bank k -located in the same country as bank iwith country j at time t. Thus, the part of the variation that is left in the bank-country correlation can only be explained by differences in bank-speci c characteristics. In the second column, we do a similar analysis, but we also interact each bank-speci c variable with a home country dummy. This allows us to analyze whether bank-speci c variables are of different importance when considering the relationship of a bank with its home country. In the third column, we control for the impact of sovereign bond exposures. In the last column we replace the total capital ratio with the Tier 1 capital ratio. All variables are standardized, such that the coef cients indicate the impact of a one standard deviation change of the variable.
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(1) (2) (3) we control for bank-time xed effects, which boils down to comparing the impact of credit risk of different sovereigns on one and the same bank. The rst column presents the results when regressing the excess correlations on the sovereign CDS spread, a home dummy and the interaction between both. In the second column, we replace the home dummy with eba exposure data, which captures the sovereign bon exposure of a bank to the sovereign with which we are measuring the excess correlation. In the third column, an interaction term between the EBA exposure variable and the sovereign CDS spread is added. The fourth column shows the impact of bank-speci c characteristics on the relationship between the sovereign CDS spreads and the excess correlations. The last two columns are two robustness checks. In the fth column, we check whether the decrease in sample size due to using the EBA exposure data has an impact on the role of bank-speci c variables. In the last column, we include the Tier 1 capital ratio as an alternative capital measure instead of the total capital ratio. The last two rows of the third, the fourth and the last column show the impact of the sovereign CDS spread when the foreign exposure variable is one standard deviation above its mean. The exposure is expressed as a percentage of the total sovereign exposure of the bank. All variables are standardized such that the coef cients indicate the impact of a one standard deviation change.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) the excess correlations on a home dummy, a set of country-speci c characteristics and bank-time xed effects. In the second column, we also interact each country-speci c variable with a home country dummy. In the last column, we replace the home country dummy with a variable that contains EBA exposure data. By using bank-time xed effects, we ensure that the only variation left in the excess correlations can be attributed to country-speci c characteristics. All variables are standardized such that the coef cients represent the impact of a one standard deviation change in the variable.
(1) (2) This table contains robustness checks for the impact of bank-speci c characteristics on excess correlations. The rst column is the benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 2 in Table 7 . The second and the third column focus on the robustness of our results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2 we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we use alternative time windows to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the last column we use the same factor model as in our baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the country level instead of on the country-time level. Table 11 : Robustness -impact home country and sovereign CDS This table contains robustness checks for the impact of the home country effect, sovereign CDS spreads, and related interaction terms on excess correlations. The rst column is the benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 5 in Table 8 . The second and the third column focus on the robustness of our results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2 we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we use alternative time windows to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the last column we use the same factor model as in our baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the bank level instead of on the bank-time level. This table contains robustness checks for the impact of country-speci c characteristics on excess correlations. The rst column is the benchmark regression, which corresponds to column 2 in Table 9 . The second and the third column focus on the robustness of our results using different factor models to calculate the excess correlations. In column 2 we use an Itraxx only factor model, whereas we use alternative time periods to calculate the excess correlations in column 3. In the last column we use the same factor model as in our baseline setup, but we cluster standard errors at the bank level instead of on the bank-time level. 
